Dave Lochbaum

Director, Nuclear Safety Project

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Mr. Lochbaum received a BS in Nuclear Engineering from the University of Tennessee in 1979 and worked as a nuclear engineer in nuclear power plants for 17 years. In 1992, he and a colleague identified a safety problem in a plant where they were working. When their concerns were ignored by the plant manager, the utility, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), they took the issue to Congress. The problem was eventually corrected at the original plant and at plants across the country. Lochbaum joined UCS in 1996 to work on nuclear power safety. He spent a year in 2009-10 working at the NRC Training Center in Tennessee. Areas of expertise: Nuclear power safety, nuclear technology and plant design, regulatory oversight, plant license renewal and decommissioning

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Obstruction of Injustice: Making Mountains out of Molehills at the Cooper Nuclear Plant

The initial commentary in this series of posts described how a three-person panel formed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to evaluate concerns raised by an NRC worker concluded that the agency violated its procedures, policies, and practices by closing out a safety issue and returning the Columbia Generating Station to normal regulatory oversight without proper justification.

I had received the non-public report by the panel in the mail. That envelope actually contained multiple panel reports. This commentary addresses a second report from another three-person panel. None of the members of this panel served on the Columbia Generating Station panel. Whereas that panel investigated contentions that NRC improperly dismissed safety concerns, this panel investigated contentions that the NRC improperly sanctioned Cooper for issues that did not violate any federal regulations or requirements. This panel also substantiated the contentions and concluded that the NRC lacked justification for its actions. When will the injustices end? Read more >

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Pipe Rupture at Surry Nuclear Plant Kills Four Workers

Role of Regulation in Nuclear Plant Safety #7

Both reactors at the Surry nuclear plant near Williamsburg, Virginia operated at full power on December 9, 1986. Around 2:20 pm, a valve in a pipe between a steam generator on Unit 2 and its turbine inadvertently closed due to a re-assembly error following recent maintenance. The valve’s closure resulted in a low water level inside the steam generator, which triggered the automatic shutdown of the Unit 2 reactor. The rapid change from steady state operation at full power to zero power caused a transient as systems adjusted to the significantly changed conditions. About 40 seconds after the reactor trip, a bend in the pipe going to one of the feedwater pumps ruptured. The pressurized water jetting from the broken pipe flashed to steam. Several workers in the vicinity were seriously burned by the hot vapor. Over the next week, four workers died from the injuries. Read more >

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Obstruction of Injustice: Columbia Generating Station Whitewash

There’s been abundant talk recently about obstruction of justice—who may or may not have impeded this or that investigation. Rather than chime in on a bad thing, obstruction of justice, this commentary advocates a good thing—obstruction of injustice. There’s an injustice involving the Columbia Generating Station in Washington that desperately needs obstructing. Read more >

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Containment Design Flaw at DC Cook Nuclear Plant

Role of Regulation in Nuclear Plant Safety #6

Both reactors at the DC Cook nuclear plant in Michigan shut down in September 1997 until a containment design flaw identified by a Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) inspection team could be fixed. An entirely different safety problem reported to the NRC in August 1995 at an entirely different nuclear reactor began toppling dominoes until many safety problems at both nuclear plants, as well as safety problems at many other plants, were found and fixed. Read more >

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Flooding at a Florida Nuclear Plant

Role of Regulation in Nuclear Plant Safety #5

St. Lucie Unit 1 began operating in 1976. From the beginning, it was required by federal regulations to be protected against flooding from external hazards. After flooding in 2011 led to the meltdown of three reactors at Fukushima Dai-ichi in Japan, the NRC ordered owners to walk down their plants in 2012 to verify conformance with flood protection requirements and remedy all shortcomings. The owner of St. Lucie Unit 1 told the NRC that only one minor deficiency had been identified and it was fixed.

But heavy rainfall in January 2014 flooded the Unit 1 reactor auxiliary building with 50,000 gallons through flood barriers that had been missing since at least 1982. Unit 1 became as wet as the owner’s damp assurances and the NRC’s soggy oversight efforts. Read more >

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